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THE DUTY TO BARGAIN IN GOOD FAITH,
BOULWARISM, AND A PROPOSALTHE ASCENDANCE OF THE RULE
OF REASONABLENESS
By LEROY S. MAXWELL, JR.*

It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer ...
to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives
of his employees ....

To bargain collectively is the performance of the mutual
obligation of the employer and the representative of the
employees to .

.

. confer in good faith .

.

. but such obliga-

tion does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or
require the making of a concession .... 2
What is "good faith bargaining"?
Is it consistent with "good faith" for an employer, considering
himself a buyer in the job market, to scientifically decide what
offer is "right" for his employees under the current economic conditions of the nation, industry, company, and employees; to enter
negotiations with the employees' representatives pre-determined
not to sign a contract containing terms different from those the
company thought "right," except to the extent the union can prove
the terms economically unsound; and to stick to his unyielding
position when the union fails to show to his satisfaction that his
offer is not "right"? If the Act requires no "concessions," is not
the employer bargaining in good faith if his offer was in fact a
"reasonable" one? The NLRB recently answered these questions
"No" in General Electric Co. and International Union of Electrical,
Radio and Machine Workers, AFL-CIO.8 Their action in effect
condemned the bargaining technique employed in "Boulwarism,"
an employee relations concept developed and popularized by General Electric.
This article will investigate the problems created by the apparent clash between modern management-employee relations concepts such as "Boulwarism" and the statutory duty-to-bargain-ingood-faith as interpreted by the NLRB in its GE decision. It is
* B.A., 1963, Juniata College; LL.B., 1966, University of Pennsyl-

vania, member of the Pennsylvania Bar.

1. Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 8(a) (5), 61
Stat. 142 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (5) (1958).
2. Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 8(d), 61
Stat. 142 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1958).

3. 150 N.L.R.B. 192 (1964) [hereinafter cited as General Electric].
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submitted that the apparent clash can best be eliminated by putting
greater emphasis on a "reasonableness" requirement that has quietly pervaded federal labor law throughout its history and by removing the prohibition against "take-it-or-leave-it" bargaining.
Federal law should require a negotiator to fully explain his position
to the other negotiator, and that he explain what of the other's
position he cannot accept and why. It should also ensure the employee a fair deal by requiring the negotiator to make a "reasonable" offer. No more should be asked of the negotiator-not even
that he "give in, at least a little, to prove that benefits come from
unions rather than employers. ' 4 Fairness to the employee and candid negotiation should be valued above "horse-trade" bargaining
in today's sophisticated management-labor relations.
THE EVOLUTION OF THE "DUTY TO BARGAIN" CONCEPT

To understand current interpretation of the "good faith" standard and to appreciate the subtle pervasion of a "reasonableness"
requirement into labor law, it is necessary to investigate the background of today's law. The appearance of a strong "reasonableness" rule as a result of the GE decision would not be a revolution
but an evolution.
As early as 1934 the National Labor Board, deciding the Connecticut Coke Co.5 case under the National Industrial Recovery
Act, saw a need to imply a standard of reasonableness in defining
the employees' "right" to bargain collectively. The Board said that
"while the law does not compel the parties to reach agreement, it
does contemplate that both parties will approach the negotiations
with an open mind and will make a reasonable effort to reach a
common ground of agreement."6 A "reasonable effort" to reach
agreement would seem to require the employer to advance a reasonable proposal to escape the censure of the Board.
The next decision defining the bargaining obligation of section 7 (a) was rendered the same year by the old NLRB. In Houde
Engineering Corp.,7 the Board observed that "the company's conception of its duty [to bargain collectively was that it] should
periodically receive each committee, listen to its suggestions, discuss them politely and then act upon them or not as it might see
fit."8 As will become apparent later, this observation could as
easily have come from the NLRB decision on GE. Although the
employers in the two cases were operating under different legal
theories, the position into which they placed their respective
unions-that of an advisor-is similar.
4. Petro, Unfair Labor Policy: A Critic Appraises the NLRB Decision
Against General Electric, Barrons, Feb. 8, 1965, p. 9.

5.
6.
7.
8.

2 N.L.B. 88 (1934).
Id.at 89. (Emphasis added.)
1 N.L.R.B. (old) 35 (1934).
Id. at 39.
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The Houde Board recognized that the fundamental aim of the
NIRA was to "restore prosperity by increasing purchasing power"
and that this could be accomplished only if re-employment could
be effectuated on a large scale through collective bargaining agreements reflecting uniform wages, hours, and working conditions.
Accordingly, they believed that "Congress did not intend the right
[of the employee to bargain collectively] to be sterile,"'10 and that
"any interpretation of [the duty to bargain of] section 7 (a) which
in practice would hamper ... the making of collective agreements
cannot be sound."" The Board then announced the "incontestibly
sound principle"'12 that the employer had a duty "to negotiate in
good faith with his employees' representatives; to match their proposals, if unacceptable, with counter-proposals; and to make every
reasonable effort to reach an agreement."'13
The next step, logically, would have been for the board
to judge objectively of the reasonablenessof the employer's
contentions and proposals, on the theory that the refusal
to accept reasonable proposals and the making of unreasonable counter-proposals (at least where not made simply
for "trading" purposes) is evidence at least of lack of intent to make agreements, if not of lack of good faith. 14
The least that should have resulted from such reasoning was a requirement of a reasonable final offer, although requiring all proposals and counterproposals to be reasonable would be preferable
to unnecessary and time consuming "horse-trading."
The following year Senator Wagner told the Senate that
"the sound result which the Labor Board reached [in Houde]
by interpretation of a vague law [the NRA] should be confirmed
and protected by a clear definition of congressional policy."15
That protection came in the form of section 8(a) (5) which required the employer to "bargain collectively."
The Congress which passed the Wagner Act did not contemplate a duty to bargain with such far-reaching effects as it has
today. As Cox points out, however, none of the Congressmen
who spoke concerning the act appeared to appreciate the difficulties of application of the duty to bargain.' 6 Senator Wagner
in epitomizing the discussion asserted that section 8(5) "does not
compel anyone to make a compact of any kind if no terms are
arrived at that are satisfactory to him. The very essence of collective bargaining is that either party shall be free to withdraw
9. Id. at 36.
10. Id. at 35.
11. Id. at 37.
12. Id. at 39.
13. Ibid. (Emphasis added.)
14. Smith, The Evolution of the "Duty to Bargain" Concept in American Law, 39 Mica. L. REV. 1065, 1080 (1941).
15. 79 Coxd.REc. 7571 (1935) (remarksof Senator Wagner).
16. Cox, The Duty to Bargain in Good Faith, 71 HARV. L.: REV. 1401,
1406 (1958).
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if its conditions are not met. '1 7 This seems to contradict the
Houde decision. "Then, in the next paragraph, he turned to
plead for the enactment of Section 8(5) as clear congressional
confirmation of the 'incontestibly sound principle' established by
the Houde Engineering case."18
The speech quoted most frequently as evidence of Congressional intent was delivered in very clear but rather exaggerated
language by Senator Walsh:
When the employees have chosen their organization, when
they have selected their representatives, all the bill proposes to do is to escort them to the door of the employer
and say "Here they are, the legal representatives of your
employees." What happens behind those doors is not inquired into and the bill does not seek to inquire into it. 9
It is difficult, when dealing with section 8(a) (5), to say accurately that any particular trend in labor relations policy is a
"departure from Congressional intent, for the very good reason
that such intent cannot be clearly determined. The problem obviously was not thought out." 0 The best evidence of Congressional intent is the Senate committee report:
The committee wishes to dispel any possible false impressions that this bill is designed to compel the making of
agreements or to permit governmental supervision of their
terms. It must be stressed that the duty to bargain collectively does not carry with it the duty to reach an agreement because the essence of collective bargaining is that
either party shall be free to decide whether proposals made
to it are satisfactory. But after deliberation, the committee
has concluded that this fifth unfair labor practice should
be inserted in the bill. It seems clear that a guarantee of
the right of the employees to bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing is a mere delusion if
it is not accompanied by the correlative duty on the part
of the other party to recognize such representatives as they
have been designated (whether as individuals or labor organizations) and to negotiate with them in a bona fide
effort to arrive at a collective bargaining agreement. Furthermore, the procedure of holding governmentally supervised elections to determine the choice of representatives
of employees becomes of little worth if after the election
its results are for all practical purposes ignored. Experience
has proved that neither obedience to law nor respect for
law is encouraged by holding forth a right unaccompanied
by fulfillment.
Such a course provokes constant strife,
21
not peace.
17. 79 CONG. REc. 7571 (1935) (remarks of Senator Wagner).
18. Cox, supra note 16, at 1406.
19. 79 CONC. REc. 7660 (1935) (remarks of Senator Walsh).
20. Smith, supra note 14, at 1107.
21. S. REP. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1935).
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Notably, the report required a "bona fide" effort to reach agreement, but the statute itself failed to mention "good faith." To
have included those words, however, would not have resulted in
the industrial "peace" sought by the committee. The committee
report is consistent with the adoption of a sophisticated "reasonableness" rule as proposed in this article. But specific support
for the rule from legislative history would better come from Senator Wagner's statement that the Act adopts the Houde rule.
The commonly accepted interpretation of the Act, that of
Senator Walsh, 22 soon appeared too narrow to effectuate its
purposes. The NLRB in its first annual report said that "Collective bargaining is something more than the mere meeting of an
employer with the representatives of his employees; the essential thing is rather the intent to adjust differences and to reach
an acceptable

common ground.

12

The

Supreme

Court com-

mented that since
the National Labor Relations Act is designed to promote
industrial peace by encouraging the making of voluntary
agreements governing relations between unions and employees, 24 the limitation implied by [Senator Walsh's "behind-closed doors" speech] has not been in practice maintained-practically, it could hardly have been-but the underlying purpose of the remark has remained the most
basic purpose of the statutory provision. That purpose is
the making effective of the duty of management to extend
recognition to the union; the duty of management to bargain in good faith is essentially a corollary of its duty to
recognize the union. [T] he requirement of collective bargaining, although so premised, necessarily
led beyond the
25
door of, and into, the conference room.

The NLRB accordingly began to examine actual bargaining conduct.
Definition of "Good Faith" Bargaining
The first test formulated by the NLRB was "willingness to
agree." At the inception of the NLRA many employers flatly
refused to bargain with representative unions in the belief that
the NLRB could not compel their .compliance.
Consequently
the "willingness to agree" test was quite useful at that time. At
first it could almost have been a "willingness to confer" test.
In NLRB v. George P. Pilling & Son Co. 26 the court found

almost absolute refusal to meet and speak with an agent of the
duly recognized union. Mr. Pilling, the only person who could
bind the company, attended one meeting at which he kept
22. See text accompanying note 19 supra.
23. 1 NLRB ANN. REP. 86, 88 (1936).
24. NLRB v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395, 401-02 (1952).
25. NLRB v. Insurance Agents Union, 361 U.S. 477, 484 (1960).
26.

119 F.2d 32 (3d Cir. 1941).
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his mind hermetically sealed against even the thought of entering into an agreement with the union. He persisted in
giving an arbitrary "No," or an equivalent answer, to the
union's suggestions for contract clauses, never once making
any counter-suggestion or proposals, although expressly
bidden by the union representative to do S0.27
The court expressed profound insight into the nature of "good
faith bargaining" in this early case when it said:
Bargaining presupposes negotiations between parties carried on in good faith. The fair dealing which the service of
good faith calls for must be exhibited by the parties in their
approach and attitude to the negotiations as well as in their
specific treatment of the particular subjects or items for negotiation. For such purpose, there must be common willingness among the parties to discuss freely and fully their respective claims and demands and, when these are opposed,
to justify them on REASON.28
This recognition of "reason" as an element of constructive bargaining went unnoticed, however.
The problem then shifted out of the organizational stage, in
which the company had refused to recognize a need to bargain
with the union, to the bargaining stage, in which the employer
recognized his duty to bargain with the union but did not want
to honestly fulfill that duty through good faith bargaining. 29
During this period of "bargaining-in-good-faith" law many employers met with union representatives, listened to their demands
and supporting arguments, and then rejected them. "Senator
Walsh had stated that this would satisfy section 8 (5), [but] the
NLRB and
courts have always held it to be an unfair labor
30
practice."
In Wilson & Co. 3 1 the company maintained that the purpose of

the Act was to provide representation for the employees and a
forum for their representative to convey their desires and complaints to the employer. Since the Act "does not compel any agreement whatever,'

32

the company thought that it did not compel an

effort to arrive at written agreements with the union. In this, the
first of the "polite listening" cases, the court with little discussion
upheld the Board's decision of refusal to bargain in good faith."
In Highland Park Mfg. Co.34 the court found that the employer
was willing to meet with the employees' representative when requested, to confer on employee grievances, and to advise him of
27.
28.

Id. at 37.
Ibid. (Emphasis added.)
29. 43 TEXAs L. REV. 974, 977 (1965).
30. Cox, supra note 16, at 1411.
31. Wilson & Co. v. NLRB, 115 F.2d 759 (8th Cir. 1940).
32. Id. at 762.
33. Ibid.
34. NLRB v. Highland Park Mfg. Co., 110 F.2d 632 (4th: Cir. 1940).
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planned major changes in the operation of the plant. But the employer absolutely refused to bind himself to anything by contract
with the union. The court held that merely conferring with the
union would not satisfy the duty to bargain; since the company
had no intention of signing a written agreement it had violated
section 8 (a) (5) of the Act. 35
The company in Westinghouse Air Brake38 took the position
from the outset of the negotiations that "under no circumstances
would it contract for any definite period with respect to wages,
hours or other conditions of employment 3 7 because "the nature of
its business was such as to require that its wage schedule be kept
as flexible as possible at all times in order that it might successfully meet the exigencies arising out of the competition in the
trade."3 8 The court concluded that "to say in such circumstances
the employer's participations in the negotiations is for the purpose
of bargaining collectively would be to supplant actuality with mere
seeming. The very situation renders impossible an exhibition by
the employer of the good faith essential to the bargaining function."39
In Montgomery Ward40 the company's position was that it
wanted nothing from the union, rather the union wanted something from Ward. Therefore "it was up to the unions to make
proposals which would please the company . . . (since) the com-

pany had no affirmative duty to do anything."'41 From that viewpoint, the employer did fulfill its "duty to recognize the authority
of the employee representative, to participate in such discussion as
is necessary to avoid mutual misunderstanding, and to enter into
binding agreements on such terms, if any, as are mutually acceptable. '4 2 (No such terms were found.) The employer failed,
however, to fulfill its additional duty "to participate actively in the
deliberations so as to indicate a present intention to find a basis
for agreement, (and to make) a sincere effort . . . to reach a com-

mon ground. '43 The court, in finding a lack of good faith bargaining by the company because of failure to submit a counterproposal to the union, said that "Wards was not bound to offer a
counterproposal, [but] a counterproposal would, no doubt, have put
Wards' willingness to bargain beyond question. . . .44
"In 1947, the fear was expressed in Congress that the Board
'has gone very far, in the guise of determining whether or not
35. Ibid.
36. NLRB v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 120 F.2d 1004 (3d Cir. 1941).
37. Id. at 1006.
38. Ibid.
39. Ibid.
40. NLRB v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 133 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1943).
41. Id. at 685.
42. Id. at 686.
43. Ibid.
44. 1d. at 687.

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71

employers had bargained in good faith, in setting itself up as the
judge of what concessions an employer must make and of the
proposals and counter-proposalsthat he may or may not make.' 45
Yet, when the Taft-Hartley Act was passed, section 8(d) confirmed the court-developed rule requiring the parties to "confer in
good faith." 46 This action provided explicit Congressional approval
of the NLRB and court decisions, which implied a duty to bargain
in good faith, and opened the door to additional construction. At
the same time Congress limited the Board's authority by providing
that "such obligation [to bargain in good faith] does not compel
either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a
concession." 47 Consequently, the Board could no longer sit as
judge of what concessions an employer must make or what proposals and counterproposals are required.
David L. Benetar, counsel for GE, construed the statute to
mean that
both parties are bound by the statute to bargain in good
faith. Yet neither is obligated to yield to the other's demands. The parties are obligated to meet and confer in
good faith, but within these broad limits their conduct of
the bargaining and their right to bargain as effectively
as
48
they know how is preserved to them by the law.
As his interpretation of the statute implies, Benetar, as advocate
for GE, leans heavily on the "no-concession" clause and views
"good faith" as requiring little.
The American Nat'l Ins. Co. 49 Court noted that in limiting the
duty to bargain in good faith, section 8(d) employed the word
"concession" instead of the originally proposed "counterproposal"
on the recommendation of the Chairman of the NLRB who thought
that the statutory definition should not deviate from the meaning
of "good faith bargaining" as it was construed at the passage of
the NLRA. 50 The Supreme Court therefore believes that the 1947
amendments incorporated the court-made "good faith" standard in
toto. Under this view of good faith considerably more is required
of the bargainer than under the Benetar view.
Congress not only defined the duty to bargain collectively by
adding section 8(d) to the 1947 Act, but also imposed that duty on
labor organizations in section 8(b)(3). By passing section 8(b)
(3), Congress impliedly incorporated into the statute the then cur45. NLRB v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395, 404 (1952).
(Emphasis added.), citing H. R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1947).

46. Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 8(d), 61

Stat. 142 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1958).

47. Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 8(d), 61

Stat. 142 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1958).
48. Benetar, The Boundaries of the Duty to Bargain in Good Faith
Under the N.L.R.A., 15 BAYLOR L. Ruv. 127, 130 (1963).
49. NLRB v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395 (1952).

50. Id. at 404 n. 14.
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rent case law interpretation of the phrase "bargain collectively,"
which by 1947 clearly included the doctrine of "good faith." The
phrase, first used in the original statute, had acquired a refined
meaning through twelve years of judicial interpretation.
It would seem that the overall effect of the 1947 amendments,
particularly sections 8(b)(3) and 8(d), was (1) to incorporate
the case law doctrine of good faith into the statute and to grant
permission for its further development; and (2) to warn the Board
not to compel the making of any particular concession, which
caveat prevents the Board from writing labor contracts.
Cox thinks that this ambivalent statute has meaning even
though it borders on paradox. The NLRB must reach its decisions
in this area mindful that legal pressure is being put upon labor
and management to come to an agreement but that there must be
complete freedom from government interference as to the terms
of the agreement. 51 Smith would undoubtably have felt differently. Commenting in 1941, he said that
as a practical matter, a "duty to bargain" must, in order to
be capable of enforcement, be given a special definition.
Two possibilities are: (1) that it be deemed simply to require union recognition and negotiations; (2) that it be
deemed to require that plus the making of objectively reasonable proposals. These are both theoretically workable
concepts, though the second is fraught with problems not
present in the first and presupposes that standards of reasonableness can be found. . . . [If the reasonableness test
were to be adopted, the Board and the courts would] at
least have achieved the result of taking provisions barren
on
52
their face and clothing them with life and meaning.
The difficult or impossible task facing the NLRB and courts
is to devise a test to compel good faith collective bargaining
without compelling "either party to agree to a proposal or requir [ing] the making of a concession. . . ."5 The Supreme Court
made it clear that the "no-concession" clause of 8(d) was not to be
permitted to obliterate the good faith clause when it said in American Nat'l Ins. Co. that "performance of the duty to bargain requires more than a willingness to5 4'enter upon a sterile discussion
of union-management differences.
Judge Magruder, speaking for the First Circuit Court in the
second Reed & Prince 5 case, clarified slightly the methods of
avoiding this condemned sterility. He said that
while the Board cannot force an employer to make a "con51.
52.

Cox, supra note 16, at 1416.
Smith, supra note 14, at 1108.

53. Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 8(d), 61

Stat. 142 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1958).
54. NLRB v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395, 402 (1952).
55. NLRB v. Reed & Prince Mfg. Co., 205 F.2d 131 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 346 U.S. 887 (1953).
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cession" on any specific issue or to adopt any particular
position, the employer is obliged to make some reasonable
effort in some direction to compose his differences with
the union, if Sec. 8 (a) (5) is to be read as imposing any substantial obligation at all. 56
The court concluded in that case that the employer had made no
reasonable effort in any direction to try to come to terms with the
union, and had made a "calculated effort to avoid reaching an
agreement, . . . while preserving the appearance of bargaining."5' 7
"[W] hether [a company] conducted its bargaining negotiations in
good faith involves a finding of motive or state of mind which can
only be inferred from circumstantial evidence."5
Apparently Judge Magruder is saying, in carefully selected
language, that the "no-concession" clause of 8(d) demands only
that the Board not say to a bargainer "you should have made a
concession on this particular point." To permit that would allow
the Board to dictate the agreement. Magruder thinks that the
Board definitely can view a failure to make concessions as evidence of a refusal to bargain in good faith.
Judge Magruder also made a substantial contribution to the
interpretation of the "good faith" clause. Avoiding direct definition of "good faith," he instead defined "bad faith" as a "desire
not to reach an agreement with the union." 59 "Although this
formation stops somewhat short of the language of some opinions,
it expresses, as nearly as one can tell, the actual results of the
decisions." ' 0
An increasing number of courts seem to be looking negatively
to see if there is a lack of bad faith rather than looking positively
for good faith. This removes the pressure from a stubborn negotiator who sincerely wishes to agree but is exercising his full bargaining power. This leaves the court looking for a violation of
duty to bargain with the key question "Did he have a desire not to
reach an agreement?" But to ask this question begs the additional
question "How unwilling to reach agreement must he be?" The
bargainer probably has mixed motives. 61
The NLRB seems to have adopted the Magruder view of good
faith and applied it wisely in United States Pipe & Foundry Co.62
The trial examiner said:
[B] ad faith bargaining is that conduct in which a party en56. Id. at 134.
57. Id. at 135.
58. Id. at 140.
59. Id. at 134.
60. Benetar, The Duty to Bargain and the Right to Communicate,.
17 N.Y.U. CoNF. LAn. 169, 176 (1964), quoting Cox, supra at note 16. David
L. Benetar of Nordlinger, Riegelman, Benetar and Charney in New York,
was chief counsel for General Electric in its proceedings before the NLRB.
61. Cox, supra note 16, at 1417.
62. 129 N.L.R.B. 357 (1960).
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gages when it has no real desire nor intent to reach an
agreement. The facts supplied by General Counsel, however, provide ample evidence that an agreement was the
objective of all parties. Under such circumstances it is not
the function of the Board to dictate the manner in which
or the extent to which this objective is to be achieved.68
The court in NLRB v. Herman Sausage Co.6 4 also used the Magruder view of good faith and contributed slightly to its understanding when it said:
[B]ad faith is prohibited though done with sophistication
and finesse. Consequently, to sit at a bargaining table, or
to sit almost forever, or to make concessions here and there,
could be the very means by which to conceal a purposeful
strategy to make bargaining futile or fail. Hence, we have
said in more colorful language it takes more than mere
"surface bargaining," or "shadow boxing to a draw," or
"giving the Union a runaround while purporting to meet
with the Union for purpose of collective bargaining."6 5
The "Catch-Phrase"Test for Good Faith
The Board and the courts have long been involved in a game
of catch-phrases such as the one played by the court in Herman
Sausage. The court attempts to fit the facts of the case into a catchphrase that will tickle the auditory nerves of all who hear it just
long enough to deceive them into believing that a substantial test
has been devised. A few of these phrases have some definitive
value, but none of them singly nor all of them together gets at the
core of the problem-what an employer must do to satisfy his duty
to bargain in good faith. To determine whether these catch-phrase
cases are aiding the attempt to define the employer's duty, a
sampling will follow.
One type of catch-phrase is "surface indicia." "Surface indicia"
has never been satisfactorily defined, but it is used when one party
makes concessions and counterproposals on the fringe issues but refuses to do so when discussing main issues. In Southern Saddlery66
the company
met willingly and conferred at length with the Union [at
ten meetings, but that] does not necessarily establish that it
had been bargaining in good faith. Mere participation in
meetings with the Union and protestations of willingness
to bargain do not alone fulfill the requirements of Section
8 (a) (5) and 8 (d) of the Act, for these are only the surface
indicia of bargaining. Bargaining in good faith is a duty
on both sides to enter into discussions with an open and
fair mind and a sincere purpose to find a basis for agree63. Id. at 361.
64. 275 F.2d 229 (5th Cir. 1960).
65. Id. at 232.
66. Southern Saddlery Co., 90 N.L.R.B. 1205 (1950). (Emphasis added.)
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ment ....67
The Board in United States Gypsum Co.68 said that the company
"refused to bargain collectively with the Union. [The company's]
entire course of conduct shows that it engaged only in 'surface bargaining' and that its negotiations with the Union were not carried
on in good faith with an open mind or a sincere purpose to reach an
agreement." 69 Again in the Denton70 case the court found that
the company "made certain nominal and illusory 'concessions'
during the negotiations but had "engaged only in 'surface negotiations', and that its mere 'willingness to talk' was insufficient to
comply with the good faith bargaining requirement of Section
8(a) (5) .71
Another variety of catch-phrase is the "predetermined unreasonable" or "predetermined not to yield without giving reasons or
listening to opposing reasons" type. To distinguish it from "surface indicia" is difficult. To engage in "surface indicia" bargaining a negotiator would seemingly have to enter the session "predetermined not to yield" on certain central issues so that "predetermination" would always result in "surface" bargaining.
Justice Frankfurter said in his separate opinion in Truitt Mfg.
Co.7 2 that good faith "is inconsistent with a predetermined resolve not to budge from an initial position. ' 73 The California Girl
Inc. bargaining representative came to the bargaining session
"prepared [as she said] to negotiate [the union's proposal of a
wage increase] and to reject it."

74

The union negotiator, perceiv-

ing his lack of room for movement, asked "[W] hat are you going
to negotiate; your rejection?" 75 The company's position was
equally predetermined on other issues. "[The company's] contract
...offered a good deal less than the Union could claim as a matter
of law outside contractual commitments."76 Counterproposals were
such that "no labor organization which respected the obligations
inherent in its representative capacity could say anything but
'No.' 77 The Board readily found a refusal to bargain from the
company's "pre-determined unreasonable" bargaining position. 78
The trial examiner in Roy E. Hanson, Jr. Mfg. Co. 7 9 stated that
''an uncompromising attitude may be. an indication of a purpose
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.:

Id. at 1206.
94 N.L.R.B. 112 (1951).
Id. at 113.
NLRB v. Denton, 217 F.2d 567 (5th Cir. 1954).
Id. at 570.
NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149 (1956).
Id. at 154.
California Girl, Inc., 129 N.L.R.B. 209, 214 (1960).
Ibid.
Id. at 220.
Ibid.
Ibid.
137 N.L.R.B. 251 (1962).
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not to reach an agreement, and a pre-determined intention not to
yield, without giving reasons or listening to opposing reasons, shows
a disposition not to bargain. On the other hand, even the making
of concessions does not necessarily show good faith."' 0 The Board
found the company unwilling to make substantial concessions and
concluded that it came to the bargaining sessions with a predetermined position.8 '
The "closed mind" cases are substantially the same
as the "predetermined" types. For example, the Board found in Clinton
Foods that the company negotiated with a closed mind on
group
82
insurance and therefore had committed an 8 (a) (5) violation.
If the conduct was not bad enough to be called "surface,"
"predetermined" or "closed mind" bargaining, it is termed "tight"
bargaining or "a failure to find overall bad faith," and no unfair
labor practice results. In Texas Industries, Inc.,83 the Board observed that:
[W]hile it is true ... that the [company] made few concessions on issues of economic value to employees, and it is
clear that the union representatives failed in most respects
to gain their bargaining objectives, it does not inevitably
follow that such "tight" bargaining must
be termed a re4
fusal to "negotiate ...

in good faith."

For similar reasons the trial examiner in two Bethlehem Steel
cases failed to find "overall" bad faith bargaining sufficient to
constitute an 8(a) (5) violation. 5
In all these cases the Board or court seems to examine the
substantive positions and tactical conduct of the negotiators and
ask two questions: (1) Has each negotiator explained his position fully to his counterpart, indicated what part of the other's
position is unacceptable, and given reasons for his dissatisfaction?
(2) Are the parties' positions neither unreasonable nor indicative
of bad faith bargaining? If the answer to both questions is "Yes,"
no unfair practice has occurred.
The foregoing cases have all involved one party so passive in
the attempt to find a basis for agreement that "unwillingness to
agree" was inferred. In the "take-it-or-leave-it" cases, the employer
genuinely seeks agreement. He advances a proposed contract he believes just,. discusses it freely with the union, but refuses to alter
80. Id. at 265.
81. While General Electric took a substantially predetermined position, it was not unreasonable. GE was willing to discuss the problem
points fully, to change its position where it was proved wrong, and to
agree if at all possible.
82. 112 N.L.R.B. 239 (1955).
83. 140 N.L.R.B. 527 (1962).
84. Id. at 530.
85. Bethlehem Steel Co., 133 N.L.R.B. 1347, modified, 136 N.L.R.B.
1500 (1961), enforcement denied and remanded, 320'F.2d 615 (3d Cir. 1963);
Bethlehem Steel Co:,. 13.3 N.L.R.B. 1400 (1961).
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his position. Such an approach is adjudged "overall bargaining"
unfair labor practice.
The trial examiner found in Brown & Root, Inc.86 that it was
"difficult to avoid the conclusion that Respondent's position
throughout, on any proposal of any substantial importance, was
one of 'take-it-or-leave-it.' "8T In finding an 8(a) (5) violation, the
Board said that "to offer the union a contract saying, 'Take it or
leave it,' is not bargaining collectively within the meaning of the
act."88
In Texas Foundries, Inc.8 9 conditions were similar to those later
found in the GE case. Texas Foundries met with the union whenever requested, discussed the union's demands at length and made
a few minor concessions, but it entered the conference room with a
fixed idea of what was going into any contract it signed. The
company's bargaining position was frozen on that idea because it
had publicized its policy that the non-union employees and the
union employees would always be given the same terms, and the
non-union employees had already had their pay scale elevated as
far as the company thought its financial condition allowed. The
trial examiner was disturbed because the company "ignored the
Union's demands for fringe benefits and chose instead itself unilaterally to determine the form of the added benefits, though the
amount, according to its position, again represented the maximum
it believed it could then afford." 90 An 8(a) (5) violation was
found.
The "take-it-or-leave-it" cases provide an additional question
for the reviewing court to ask in a good faith bargaining case.
"Did the negotiator put forth his final and unyielding offer so
early in the negotiations that he occupies the role of unilateral dictator of the terms of any agreement?" An affirmative answer denotes an unfair labor practice.
This was the state of good-faith-bargaining law when, in 1964,
the NLRB held that GE had refused to bargain in good faith with
the IUE. Evidence of this refusal was found in (1) a failure to
furnish certain information requested by the union during negotiations; (2) attempts to deal with local unions on topics which
properly should have been discussed at the national level and solicitation of certain locals to abandon the strike called by the national union; (3) GE's presentation of its personal accident insurance proposal to the union on a "take-it-or-leave-it" basis; and
(4) GE's overall approach to and conduct of collective bargaining which was based on a general attitude of "take-it-or-leave-it." 1
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

86 N.L.R.B. 520 (1949).
Id. at 532.
Ibid.
101 N.L.R.B. 1642 (1952).
Id. at 1667. (Emphasis added.)
General Electric, 150 N.L:R.B. at 193 (trial examiner).
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The NLRB made findings sufficient to sustain an 8(a) (5) violation
on either of the first two familiar grounds. We are here concerned
with the wisdom of utilizing the last two grounds as a basis for decision.
THE DECLINE OF "BoULWARISM"
The significance of the GE case was that "Boulwarism," a relatively new concept of management's role in employer-employee relations, has been declared unlawful. The concept originated with
GE, but was employed by an increasing number of other companies.
A vital aspect of the concept is a bargaining technique which Board
Member Fanning says "can be classified as 'hard
bargaining' or 'no
92
bargaining' depending on your point of view.
In 1946 the United Electrical Workers struck GE following unsuccessful negotiations and forced GE to settle for terms beyond
those warranted by its financial condition. 3 "GE sought to determine why it had failed [as it saw it] to achieve the same high
degree of success and effectiveness in its employee relations as it
had in the other areas of its operations . . . .94 In 1947 a new vice
president at General Electric, Lemuel R. Boulware, introduced an
approach to labor relations intended to bolster GE's faltering image
as an employerf 5 In the words of Boulware GE wanted to achieve
the "same success in job marketing that we had accomplished in
product marketing."9 6
Under GE's... approach to bargaining... the Company
itself seeks through extensive year-round research into all
pertinent facts to determine what is "right" for the employees. Its research includes not only a study of business
conditions, competitive factors, economic trends and the
like, but the gathering of its own information as to the employee needs and desires through independent employee
attitude surveys, comments made by employees at informative meetings, direct discussions by supervisors
with emT
ployees and statements in union publications
Management also thought "that to gain employee job satisfaction,
loyalty and support, it was not enough that the Company be a good
employer. It was equally if not more important that the Company
be known to its employees as a good employer."' 9 Having voluntarily pioneered many employee benefit programs, GE felt that it
had always been a good employer. Therefore it perceived the problem to be a failure to effectively communicate to the employees the
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
Letter).
97.
98.

Fanning, The Duty to Bargain in 1962, 51 L.R.R.M. 87 (1963).
HARV. L. REv. 807 (1963).
General Electric, 150 N.L.R.B. at 207 (trial examiner).
Comment, 1965 DUKE L. J. 661.
Id. at 661 n. 2 (quoting from a GE Employee Relations News

Comment, 76

General Electric, 150 N.L.R.B. at 208 (trial examiner).
Id. at 207.
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company's efforts in their behalf. To convey its message to the
employees, GE began to make use of "plant newspapers, daily news
digests, employee bulletins, letters to employees' homes, television and radio broadcasts and other media of mass communication,
as well as personal contacts." 99
In preparation for their intensive personal-contact program,
which is carried to the employees through foremen and supervisors, the company conducts a training program in techniques of
persuasion for lower level management to make them more effective spokesmen for the company. This personal-contact program
is aimed not only at persuading the employees that their employer
is benevolent but also at collecting the feelings and needs of the
so that top level management can take them
individual employee
100
into consideration.
The company, realizing that it must make the employees understand that it wanted "to do right voluntarily," was forced to eliminate the traditional give-and-take process of bargaining in order to
tender initially the "right" offer for the employees. 10 1 GE claimed
that its scientific methods of investigation resulted in a fairer return to the employees than agreements resulting from classical
give-and-take bargaining. 10 2 "When bargaining begins, the Company, as a part of its overall research, listens to the presentations
made by all the unions with which it deals, and evaluates the
unions' demands with the help of all the facts it has on hand, including those supplied by the unions.'1' 3 From this information
GE develops its "firm, fair offer," which while not made on a "takeit-or-leave-it" basis is substantially that, unless the unions can introduce new information which would indicate that GE's initial
offer was not "right.'' 4
At the trial examiner's hearing GE contended that practically
every offer it had made under its practice of Boulwarism had been
altered in some way after discussions with the unions, 10 5 but it appeared that after this new material had been assimilated into GE's
research and the "right offer" presented, few changes of any importance were ever made.10 6.
"After the Company's offer is presented to the unions, the flow
of communications . . . reaches flood proportions.

GE's . . .basic

purpose is to compete with the bargaining representative for the
allegiance and support of the employees.' ' 0 7 Coupled with this,
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104..
105.
106.
107.

Id. at 208.
Comment, supra note 93, at 808.
General Electric, 150 N.L.R.B. at 207 (trial examiner).
Id. at 208.
Ibid.
Comment, supra note 95, at 662.
General Electric, 150 N.L.R.B. at 208 n. 6 (trial examiner).
Id. at 208.
Id. at 209.
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GE has a policy that no strike, threat of strike, or other economic
pressure will cause them to alter their offer to the extent that it
would be "incorrect."'' 08 Through this thorough and integrated approach to labor relations that became known as Boulwarism, General Electric set itself up as a benevolent monarch operating under
a constitutional requirement to listen to the recommendations of an
advisor union.
A possible danger inherent in this form of collective bargaining is that its use over a long period of time will tend to inhibit employee willingness to strike since the futility of attempting to
achieve gains beyond GE's offer would be well established. 1 9 The
employees would also begin to see the impotency of a union which
almost never obtains anything substantial for the employees beyond that offered by GE and eventually the employees would leave
the union. There is no evidence, however, that employees have left
the unions at GE through the nearly twenty years of Boulwarism
even though GE has taken an active interest in certification and decertification elections. 110 Likewise practice has not shown any unwillingness to strike. "Certainly after sixteen years of Boulwarism, unionism in General Electric [was] far from being either dead
or even showing any signs of fatal wounds." '' The trial examiner
found, however, that it was never
GE's motive to seek removal of
12
the IUE as a bargaining agent.
The grounds were laid for the 1960 strike in 1958 when the
union suffered a severe defeat in that year's bargaining. A personal vendetta seemed to exist from that time or even before between GE management and the IUE leadership.
IE president
James Carey reportedly evidenced this by saying "I owe GE a
strike."'1 3 Carey denied the statement." 4 In any event, the IUE
did not intend to suffer another setback in 1960. It embarked on a
massive campaign to prepare its workers and the public for a possible strike. 115
Although GE offered significant wage increases in 1960 as part
of its "firm, fair offer," IUE refused to accept the offer. When GE
froze its position by making public its offer, a strike resulted. It
lasted three weeks until ME capitulated and signed a contract on
GE's terms. IUE then brought its case to the Board.
GE contended that although the duty to bargain in good faith
demanded a state of mind of willingness to reach agreement, sec108.
109.
110.

Ibid.
Comment, supra note 93, at 808.
General Electric, 150 N.L.R.B. at 209 (trial examiner).

111. NORTHuP, BOULWARISM:
GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY 120

112.
113.
July 27,
114.
115.

THE LABOR RELATIONS

POLICIES OF THE

(1964).
General Electric, 150 N.L.R.B. at 274.
Comment, supra note 93, at 809 n. 20, citing Steel Magazine,
1959, p. 71.
Id. at 809 n. 20, citing Brief for General Counsel, p. 14.
Id. at 809.
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tion (8) (d) does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or
require the making of a concession. Therefore, GE maintained that
it had complied with its statutory duty by entering the negotiations with a desire to reach an agreement." 6
The trial examiner related GE's attitude toward traditional
bargaining procedure:
[GE] extols its "fair and firm offer" approach as a straightforward one that removes doubt from employees' minds as
to precisely where it stands. It disparagingly refers to the
"ask and bid" or "auction" form of bargaining as a "flea
bitten eastern type of cunning and dishonest but pointless
haggling." Such bargaining, according to the Respondent's
articulation, allows a union to APPEAR to get more than
an employer is willing to give, though that is often not the
case, and this only serves, it says, to mislead employees into
believing that union officials are useful in ways they are
not, thus falsely enhancing the union's prestige while diminishing that of the employer and encouraging employee support of union shows of strength. The Respondent's approach on the other hand, it says, makes it obvious to employees that the Company "is not being forced
to be fair
117
by the belligerant action of a labor union."
General Counsel charged that:
[W]hen GE made its offer to the IUE . . . and informed
the union ... this was General Electric's first and last offer
and that General Electric intended to stand firm on such
offer. .

.

. General Electric entered into the bargaining

with a closed mind and a fixed intention to adopt the course
that it did, namely, listen. . . to what the union had to say
. . .make the offer and.

. .

stick to it.' 1 8

Chief Counsel for IUE, Sigal, asserts that:
Boulwarism involves more than merely a hard bargaining
approach. It involves, in fact, a double-pronged violation of
the bargaining obligation-the denial to the union of its
rightful role at the bargaining table, coupled with an attempt to market the employer's proposals for a collective
bargaining agreement directly to its employees over the
head of the exclusive bargaining agent. This form of bargaining negates the role of the union as the joint participant
in negotiations and relegates it to a subordinate role as only
one source through which the employer may ascertain the
desires of its employees. 19
The trial examiner found that collective bargaining as practiced by GE was a mere formality in which the union negotiators
116. Id. at 812.
117. General Electric, 150 N.L.R.B. at 208.
118. Comment, supra note 93, at 812, citing Brief for Respondent,
pp. 29-30.
119. Sigal, The Evolving Duty to Bargain,52 GEO. L. J. 379, 389 (1964).
Mr. Sigal was chief counsel for the IUE in its suit against General Electric.
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were transformed from partners in the bargaining process to advisors to the principal fact finder and ultimate judge-management. 120 He noted that the term "bargain collectively" as used in
the Act "has been considered to absorb and give statutory approval
to the philosophy of bargaining as worked out in the labor movement in the United States.' 121 That philosophy has centered
around the "ask and bid" form of union-management dealing,
which is the means to the end of making the union and management equal partners in determining "wages, hours, and other terms
and conditions of employment." The NLRB concluded that GE's
bargaining approach "undoubtably eliminates the 'ask-and-bid' or
'auction' form of bargaining, [and] in the process devitalizes negotiations and collective bargaining and robs them of their commonly accepted meaning."'122 Consequently, the "overall bargaining" approach of Boulwarism
was held to be a violation of sec23
tion 8(a) (5) of the Act.
The communications program, while not an unfair labor practice in itself, was considered a significant aspect of the unfair practice found by the Board. As such, the program was made subject
to the general cease-and-desist order.124 While this writer agrees
with Dr. Northrup, who says that "Beyond much question, GE's
communication program involved the kind of argument and expression of opinion" allowed by section 8(c), which "protects arguments and opinions, not (just) academic treatises,"' 25 a discussion of the communications problem, vital to Boulwarism, is without the scope of this paper.
One observer said that "the General Electric decision is difficult even for specialists to reconcile 'with the law either as Congress wrote it or as the Supreme Court has interpreted it.' ",120
It would seem that the General Electric decision substantially narrowed the negotiators' rights to make no concessions, for GE has
been told that it cannot go into the negotiations with an intent to
make no concessions even though it has all the relevant information
concerning the employees' needs and feels compelled to be fair to
its employees because of its active and intense interest in the labor
market.
An earlier Board decision involving Boulwarism indicated that
"to discourage the bargaining tactics of Boulwarism, Section
8(a) (5) must be read to require more than a desire to reach agreement; it must also require that a party approach the bargaining
120. General Electric, 150 N.L.R.B. at 195.
121. Id. at 195 n.16.
122. Id. at 195.
123. Id. at 196.
124. Petro, Unfair Labor Policy: A Critic Appraises the NLRB Decision
Against General Electric, Barrons, Feb. 8, 1965, p. 9, at p,24.
125. Id. at p. 23.
126. Id. at p. 9.
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table with his mind open to compromise.' 27 The GE Board so
read the statute although there the company's position was not unreasonable.
In destroying the GE bargaining method under its Boulwarism approach, the Board may have frozen methods of collective
bargaining into an inflexible mold"" even though it expressly disclaimed such intention.
The [GE decision] places so high a premium on give and
take in negotiations that it seemingly declares initial candor
inconsistent with good faith bargaining; consequently, [it]
may compel employers and unions to waste time and money
in needless preliminary bickering
before they feel free to
129
state their positions clearly.
The Philip Carey Mfg. Co. v. NLRB 130 case held that the company did not violate 8(a) (5) when the company took a firm position at the eleventh session and refused to budge from it. The
court said that "the Company was entitled to take a definite position at that time.""'
When the Carey and GE decisions are compared, they seem to
tell the labor negotiator-"You may embrace most of the theory
and methods of Boulwarism, come to the bargaining table knowing
what is right for the employees, and insist on that right to impasse
without violating 8(a) (5); but, you must (1) fill the record with
enough proposals and counterproposals offering less than your final offer but which are not so outrageous that a self-respecting
union would refuse them; (if the offers are outrageous the NLRB
will look at their substance and decide that you are not bargaining
in good faith) and (2) waste enough time and money doing this
so that the NLRB will not decide that you insisted on your firm
offer too soon." Apparently this is what the NLRA requires of
the Boulwarist in this transition period in the history of section
8(a) (5).
The present rule requires "ask and bid" bargaining between
company and union as equal partners, thereby eliminating initial
candor but allowing a firm, fair position at a later time. Is this a
good rule? Perhaps it is. The announced purpose of the NLRA,
to force negotiators to discuss their respective positions with each
other, may sometimes result in honest efforts to reach agreement
even when one negotiator enters the talks with no intent to yield
from a preconceived notion of what is "right." Perhaps it is not.
Maybe the rule should be changed to prevent even this modified
use of Boulwarism. The better rule would permit full use of Boulwarism by permitting the NLRB to examine the reasonableness of
127. California Girl, Inc., 129 N.L.R.B. 209, 219 (1960).
128.
129.
130.
131.

Comment, supra note 95, at 665-66.
Id. at 666.
331 F.2d 720 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 888 (1964).
Id. at 725.
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the offers made by the negotiators as the test of good faith.
The search for a solution to the Boulwarist's predicament
prompted an extensive analysis of the requirements of sections
8(a) (5) and 8(d) earlier in this article. During that analysis several policy questions arose. In light of modern employer bargaining sophistication and new job marketing policies as typified by
Boulwarism, let us return to those questions and determine whether
their answers will clarify the bargaining obligation of a Boulwarist.
First, how does one reconcile the apparent clash between the
"no concession" provision of section 8(d) and the "duty to bargain in good faith" provisions of sections 8 (a) (5), 8(b) (3), and 8(d) ?
Remember that the Supreme Court has made it clear that the "no
concession" clause will not be permitted to obliterate the good faith
clause in the event of conflict. Judge Magruder intimated in the
second Reed & Prince case that no clash existed since section 8 (d)
only prevented the NLRB from telling the negotiator where he
had to make a concession and thereby dictating the terms of the
agreement. 13 2 Under present law, then, failure to make concessions can be viewed as some evidence of a lack of good faith. The
trial examiner in GE relied in part on the fact that GE made few
substantial concessions.
One could argue, as did GE, that section 8(d) is broad enough
to condone a refusal to make concessions. To ever succeed before
a tribunal applying present law, that argument would need to be
coupled with the proposition that the initial offer was "reasonable."
If a "reasonableness" standard were adopted as a measure of good
faith, there would be no need to consider the number of concessions
when an original offer is determined to be reasonable.
Next, one must decide what "good faith" really means. It has
18 3
been defined as the lack of "a desire not to reach an agreement."
Evidence of bad faith is sought through two usually unverbalized
questions. The Board first asks if the negotiators have engaged in
a tactical negotiation procedure in which each party has fully explained to the other his position, what part of the other's position
is unacceptable to him, and why. Are such negotiation procedures
valuable? Cox thought so:
On principle, refusing to participate in the give-and-take
of argument ought to be an unfair labor practice. Participation in debate often produces changes in a seemingly
fixed position either because new facts are brought to light
or because the strengths and weaknesses of the several arguments become apparent. Sometimes the parties hit upon
some novel compromise of an issue which has been thrashed
over and over. Much is gained even by giving each side a
better picture of the strength of the other's convictions.
132. NLRB v. Reed & Prince Mfg. Co., 205 F.2d 131 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 346 U.S. 887 (1953).
133. Id. at 134.
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justify
The cost is so slight that the potential gains easily
34
legal compulsion to engage in the discussion.1
The Board agreed in Town & Country Mfg. Co.:'15 "Experience
has shown ...

that candid discussion of mutual problems by labor

and management frequently results in their resolution with attendant benefit to both sides."' 138 The Supreme Court believed that
"discussion conducted under [the standard of good faith imposed
by Congress] may narrow the issues, making the real demands of
the parties clearer to each other, and perhaps to themselves, and
' 13
may encourage an attitude of settlement through give and take."
The Board then asks whether the parties' positions are unreasonable and consequently indicative of bad faith. To do so the Board
must delve into the substantive terms of the negotiators' proposals.
Standing in their way, however, is the Supreme Court's statement
that "the Board may not, either directly or indirectly, compel conupon the substantive terms
cessions or otherwise sit in judgment
' 8
of collective bargaining agreements." "1

The circuit court in Reed & Princeanswers this dictum by saying that "at the same time it seems clear that if the Board is not to
be blinded by empty talk and by the mere surface motions of collective bargaining, it must take some cognizance of the reasonableness of the positions taken by an employer in the course of bargaining negotiations. '139 With this pronouncement of Chief Judge
Magruder the writer heartily agrees. In that case the employer
"engaged in a lengthy series of bargaining conferences, which got
nowhere."' 40 The duty of a court faced with that situation is to decide whether "it is to be inferred from the totality of the employer's
conduct that he went through the motions of negotiation as an
elaborate pretense with no sincere desire to reach an agreement if
possible, or that it bargained in good faith but was unable to arrive at an acceptable agreement with the union." 14 Investigation
of the substantive positions and application of a "reasonableness"
test proved helpful in that situation to show that the employer
had no sincere desire to reach agreement.
The Reed & PrinceBoard had found a refusal to bargain on the
company's part in its refusal to put a provision of the labor statute
into the contract.
We believe that once the [company] itself insisted on incorporating the substance of the first proviso in Section
134. Cox, The Duty to Bargain in Good Faith, 71 HARV. L. REV. 1401,
1412 (1958).
135. 136 N.L.R.B. 1022 (1962).
136. Id. at 1027.
137. NLRB v. Insurance Agents Union, 361 U.S. 477, 488 (1960).
138. NLRB v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395, 404 (1952).
139. NLRB v. Reed & Prince Mfg. Co., 205 F.2d 131, 134 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 346 U.S. 887 (1953).
140. Ibid.
141. Ibid.
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9 (a) into the recognition clause, if it were seeking a good
faith disposition of issues, it would have readily acceded to
the Union's natural request to include the second proviso
[giving the union the right to be present at an adjustment
between an individual or group and the company, which
adjustment was included in the first proviso]. The [company] saw fit to make an issue about the simple recognition
clause proposed by the Union, and then failed to accede to
the Union's reasonable countersuggestion, comparable to
the [company's] own amendment, to include the whole of
Section 9 (a). We cannot conceive of a good faith basis for
a refusal to incorporate a statutory obligation into a contract in the very words of the statute. This type of quibling conduct is consistent only with the
142 conclusion that
there was bad, not good faith bargaining.
Another instance in which the NLRB looks at the substance of
a negotiator's position is when it believes the negotiator's position
to be so intolerable to the union as to suggest a stalling purpose,
for example, when management demands a drop in wages from
those offered the employees before the union was voted in. 143 That
example is clear, but where is the line drawn between "clear" cases
into which the NLRB will substantively inquire and "unclear" cases
into which it will not?
In the cases thus far discussed, the company was clearly unwilling to agree. There a superficial examination of the substantive nature of the negotiations sufficed to reveal the proscribed state
of mind. Why should the Board be prohibited from investigating
the substantive positions of the parties when the company is not
"clearly" unwilling to agree? Such a policy would eliminate the
difficulty of categorizing each case.
Originally the unskilled industrial employee was completely at
the mercy of his employer. Through self-help and government assistance he has been able to secure fair treatment. The self-help
has come through the formation of effective unions, which exist for
the good of the employees and not vice versa. The government's
labor policy has aided the employees primarily by assisting the
unions. It is important, however, that the government be constantly aware that its purpose is to help the employee get a fair deal
and not necessarily to enhance the power of the unions. For the
NLRB, which exists basically to ensure the employee a fair deal, to
be prevented from reviewing the substantive positions of the bargainers to ascertain their reasonableness, produces a result nearly
as unreliable as that of a football scorekeeper listening to the roars
of the crowd from without the stadium. Those roars, like the bargaining tactics which the Board is today allowed to consider, are
only attention-drawing indicators that something may be happening on the playing field that will affect the score. Just as a score142.
143.

Reed & Prince Mfg. Co., 96 N.L.R.B. 850, 855 (1951).
Cox, supra note 134, at 1422.
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keeper would not depend on these indicators to determine the final
outcome of the game, neither should the Board look at indicators
such as "no concessions" and "take-it-or-leave-it" bargaining to determine whether the employee has been offered a fair deal. To
reach the desired result without denying the company and its employees through their representatives the right to decide the terms
of the agreement, the NLRB could require the bargainers to take
"reasonable" positions. For the NLRB to judge "reasonableness"
it must be permitted to enter the stadium-it must be allowed to
fully and openly scrutinize the substantive nature of the proposals.
THE MOVEMENT TOWARD A "REASONABLENESS"

STANDARD

By 1960 the Board was straining for authority to look more extensively into the substance of negotiators' positions. In "M" System, Inc.144 the trial examiner said:
I am fully aware that it is not for the Board to "sit in judgment on the substantive terms of collective bargaining
agreements."' 145 That does not mean, however, that bargaining positions may not be given evidentiary consideration, along with all other relevant circumstances, in determining whether an employer by the totality of his conduct
satisfied the good-faith bargaining standards. Good faith
or the want of it is a state of mind, and positions taken at a
bargaining table provide at least one manifestation of
146 the
state of mind with which negotiations are conducted.
In 1962 the Supreme Court impliedly granted the Board leave
147
to inquire into the subject matter of negotiatons. NLRB v. Katz
involved an employer which made unilateral increases of wages
and fringe benefits during negotiations. The Court, in affirming
the Board's holding of an unfair labor practice, said "It follows
that the Board may hold such unilateral action to be an unfair labor
practice in violation of § 8 (a) (5), without also finding the employer
guilty of over-all subjective bad faith. '148 The Court did not need
to search for a "failure of subjective good faith," since it found a
refusal to negotiate "in fact." Yet it implied that a negotiator has
a two step duty: first to bargain "in fact" and second to bargain
in "subjective good faith." The second step requires a subjective
look at the negotiations between the parties. This the Supreme
Court had previously prohibited.
The employer in Philip Carey Mfg. Co. v. NLRB 149 took a firm
position at the eleventh meeting and continued to substantially ad144.
145.
134 (1st
146.
147.
148.
149.

129 N.L.R.B. 527 (1960).
Id. at 550, citing NLRB v. Reed & Prince Mfg. Co., 205 F.2d 131,
Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 887 (1953).
129 N.L.R.B. at 551.
369 U.S. 736 (1962).
Id. at 747.
331 F.2d 720 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 888 (1964).
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here to it. The court scrutinized the company's proposal and observed that its
proposed contract contained a number of improvements
over existing benefits and was the biggest economic package
offered by the Company at any of its seven other plants in
the United States ....

Furthermore there were eleven

more meetings between0 [the pivotal eleventh meeting] and
the date of the strike.16
The court obviously made an extensive excursion into the substance of the company's final offer and even compared it with contracts existing at the employer's other plants. Their conclusion
was that "the Company did not exceed the limits of permissible
bargaining by adhering substantially to its [eleventh meeting] proposal and that [it] continued to bargain in good faith from [the
eleventh meeting] to the time of the strike. ..."151
The Board's analysis of proposed terms is necessary to determine whether the company is beginning at a "ridiculously unreasonable" position and "bargaining" to an "unreasonable position"
to hide its desire to not bargain at all, or whether the company
has modified its original position with a sincere willingness to reach
agreement in compliance with its duty to bargain in good faith.
The duty of the NLRB is to insure the employee a fair deal-not
to determine whether the company has yielded somewhat, although
compromise may be needed to persuade the employee that the
union is getting him the fair deal. When the company has voluntarily given the employee a fair deal the NLRB should not interfere.
A problem in this area is that the complaining party wants the
Board to consider each particle of the negotiations individually under a microscope. The Board has said concerning its permissible
function in reviewing overall bargaining that:
[T]o ask the Board to sit in judgment of each thrust and
counterthrust, to measure each proposal and counterproposal, and to appraise each challenge and rejoinder is to
impose a task not only impractical but beyond the Board's
authority under the statute as the Supreme Court so clearly
stated in American National Insurance Company. It was
precisely this fear that the Board was acting as a judge of
what concessions an employer must make and of what proposals and counterproposals he may or may not make which
led to the Taft-Hartley amendments and the enactment of
Section 8 (d) .152
The intensity of their investigation must obviously be limited by
practical considerations.
Another pertinent point is that it is not unreasonable, and there150.
151.
152.

Id. at 725.
Ibid.
McCulloch Corp., 132 N.L.R.B. 201, 216 (1961).
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fore not a violation of the duty to bargain in good faith, for a bargainer to refuse to agree to reasonable terms proposed by his counterpart. Conceivably two negotiators could be holding to entirely
reasonable positions and be bargaining in good faith without reaching agreement. The court in Texas Foundries,Inc. 153 said that "the
failure of an employer to agree to terms deemed reasonable by the
board is not a proper basis for finding
that an employer has been
15' 4
guilty of bargaining in bad faith.

The Board has clearly adopted a policy of looking at the substance of the negotiations as an important test of good faith. This
policy is consistent with the statute, has some Supreme Court approval, and is working quite effectively. Professor Cox envisualized
problems in the new policy:
For the Board to appraise the employer's bargaining position with respect to some major issue as a means of ascertaining his good faith would involve passing judgment upon
the reasonableness of his proposals and thus would apply
pressure to make concessions. There are too many reasons
why an employer who is willing to contract with a union
might wish to deny a wage increase or maintain an open
shop for the Board to draw an inference of bad faith from
the unreasonableness of his position. The policy of allowing
free negotiation upon such matters is too strong to warrant
the risk of government interference even when a weak
inference might seem justified by experience. 155
The Board avoids this pitfall, however, by applying the reasonableness standard, not to isolated items, but only to the overall bargaining issue.
Cox also saw a danger that government regulation of collective bargaining might cause negotiators to bargain with too much
concern for the judging eye of the NLRB and not enough concern
for reaching agreement. He thought it necessary before expanding the government's role in collective bargaining that care be taken
not to make the government an unwelcome hindering pest or threat
to rapid agreement. "' There has been no evidence of this problem.
Smith, on the other hand, observed that "the way would seem
to be open for the board, if it should so desire, to use a test of reasonableness, for it can scarcely be contended that there is no relationship between reasonableness and good faith." 157 Even Cox admitted that "the logical consequence of the duty to bargain [is]
that the NLRB scrutinize the reasonableness of an employer's position as the measure of good faith."' 5 8
153. Texas Foundries, Inc. v. NLRB, 211 F.2d 791 (5th Cir. 1954).
154. Id. at 794.
155. Cox, supra note 134, at 1419.
156. Id. at 1440.
157. Smith, The Evolution of the "Duty to Bargain" Concept in American Law, 39 Micn. L. REV. 1065, 1098 (1941).
158. Cox, supra note 134, at 1406. (Emphasis added.)

Summer 1967]

THE DUTY TO BARGAIN IN GOOD FAITH

557

The Board's rule condemning "take-it-or-leave-it" positions is
becoming obsolete. No advantage accrues to the employee by requiring the employer to start low and "bargain up" to his final position, which is in effect a lawful "take-it-or-leave-it" position. The
Board should not hold a reasonable "take-it-or-leave-it" position
violative if each of the parties has fulfilled his duty to fully explain
his position and to explain what of the other's position is unacceptable to him and why. The Supreme Court said in 1952 that "the
Act does not encourage a party to engage in fruitless marathon
discussions at the expense of frank statement and support of his
position." 1 9 It is time that statement became law. GE-type Boulwarism, which does advocate frank statement of a reasonable offer
rather than fruitless marathon discussions, was erroneously declared unlawful. In light of the then existing economic condition
of the nation, the electrical industry, General Electric, and the employees, GE's offer was reasonable and should have been consistent
with good faith bargaining.
Counsel for the IUE observed that after the blunt refusals of
the 1930's and 1940's came today's "sophisticated" refusal. "The
failure to attempt to draw and hold the line puts a premium on
such sophistication,"' 160 resulting in decreased effectiveness of collective bargaining and growing public concern over its future.
The cynical argument that collective bargaining is threatened by the Board may well be a cover for the fear that the
Board will put flesh and muscle on the skeleton of the bargaining obligation. Rather than too much involvement by
the Board with the collective bargaining process, as some
there has not been
critics suggest is the case, perhaps
enough perceptive involvement.16'
There has been a tendency to underrate the practical importance
of the GE decision:
It must be remembered.

. .

that in holding the GE bargain-

ing method an unfair labor practice, the NLRB laid the
groundwork for holding that the strike which occurred
thereafter was an "unfair labor practice strike." Unfair
practice strikers are entitled to reinstatement whenever
they apply for it. If he has hired replacements, the employer must fire them, if that should prove necessary in
order to make room for the strikers. Under the circumstances he cannot hold out the promise of permanent employment for replacements. And that fact, of course, adding to the well-known hazards of "scabbing," makes it extremely difficult for employers to carry on production during an "unfair-practice" strike. Thus no comfort can be
drawn from the lack of a specific finding that "Boulwarism"
is an unfair practice, or from the absence of a specific order
159.
160.
161.

NLRB v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395, 404 (1952).
Sigal, supra note 119, at 388.
Ibid. (Emphasis added.)
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against the GE communications program. If the GE decision stands on appeal, employers will have to think very
seriously before taking firm stands in union negotiations;
many will certainly shy away from attempts to sell their
employees
directly on proposals they have submitted to the
162
union.
Boulwarism for all practical purposes will have been destroyed,
at a great cost to GE, for Boulwarism represented over sixteen
years of work by a "highly qualified staff"1 63 with "complete backing of the company's top executive. 11 64 A highly efficient system
of employee relations was developed, employing "principles of communication, careful research and marketing, and employee relations emphasis in all decision making ... all . . .understood and
administered with due regard to company environment, capacity,
and potential."' 165
While the effects of the GE decision will be felt most strongly
at GE, it will certainly make an impression on the whole of modern
management.
Anyone who attempts to integrate the decision with progressive management principles and farsighted employee
relations programs is in for a rough time.1 6 Instead of
promoting straight-forward good-faith bargaining, the
NLRB seems bent on encouraging duplicity on the part of
employers. Instead of promoting the development of coherent employee relation programs, the NLRB appears
more interested in seeing to it that employers make concessions to unions. 167 The main trend detectable in NLRB decisions over the years is mirrored in the GE decision: the
tendency to establish a sharp cleavage between employers
and their employees; to discourage if not to prohibit creative
experimentation in personnel relations . . . -all presumably in order to establish employees as the special and exclusive charges of the large trade unions. 16 8
Management-employee relations have changed drastically since
the end of the depression when current government labor policy
was born. In many fields a well qualified employee is considered
the most valuable asset. Since mobility is increasingly a characteristic of the employee, the employer must treat him well or lose him.
There will always be circumstances in which the employee is easily
replaced, but the trend has been and will continue to be toward a
relationship in which the employer, admittedly out of selfish motives, will attempt to do right voluntarily. The government should
not stand in the way of creative experimentation in personnel re162.

Petro, supra note 124, at p. 24.

163.

NOrTHRUP, op. cit. supra note 111, at 162.

164.
165.
166.
167.
168.

Ibid.
Ibid.
Petro, supra note 124, at p. 9.
Id. at 24.
Ibid.
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lations which, while giving the skilled employee a fair deal, continues to protect the easily replaceable employee from the results
of unreasonable bargaining positions. Yet,
the NLRB acts as though its main function is to frustrate and abort progress in employer-employee relations.
...[It has taken an outlook which] has nothing in common
with the fluidity, the creativeness, the dynamism of America's social and economic system ....

Therein lie the sad-

dest and most reactionary features of the Labor Board's decision against GE. 10 9
In view of the extreme position [of the Board] as to
what constitutes good faith bargaining ... and the fact that
such a position is likely to be taken against a company less
equipped to protect itself than is General Electric, the danger to collective bargaining and free enterprise inherent in
the NLRB's steady intrusion into the bargaining sphere is
as obvious as it is urgently in need of reform. 170 Many
scholars of the law are convinced that the best way to safeguard free collective bargaining is to delete the refusal to
bargain Sections 8(a) (5) and 8 (b) (3) entirely from the
law ....

Professor George W. Taylor . . . has long be-

lieved that [these sections] have no place in the TaftHartley Act, unless possibly applied 7only
to the initial con1
tract bargaining between the parties.
"The probable consequences of abandoning the duty to bargain
would be a serious weakening of union power,"' 72 an undesirable
effect in a situation where the employee is easily replaced and the
employer has no desire to treat him well. Perhaps use of the "reasonableness" test will permit experimentation in personnel relations by progressive employers and still preserve needed protections to the replaceable employee.
A PROPOSAL

The proposed "reasonableness" rule should be incorporated into
the law surrounding the good faith bargaining obligation as
follows:
(1) Section 8 (d) should be interpreted, as it was in Reed & Prince,
to mean only that the Board cannot require specific concessions. For the Board to conclude that a bargaining position is
"unreasonable," it must be saying by implication that not
enough concessions were made to bring the offer within the
"range of reasonable positions."
(2) The negotiators should be required to engage in a tactical
169. Ibid.
170. NoRTHRUP, BOULWARISM: THE LABOR RELATIONS POLICIES OF THE
GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY 120 (1964).

171. Northrup, The Case for Boulwarism, Harv. Bus. Rev., Sept.-Oct.
1963, p. 86, at p. 94.
172.

Ross, THE GOVERNMENT AS A SOURCE OF UNION PowER

263 (1964).
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bargaining procedure including (a) full explanation of their
own positions; (b) disclosure of what part of the other's position is unacceptable; and (c) the reasons why it is unacceptable. Such a procedure evidences "willingness to agree."
(3) The negotiator would not violate his duty to bargain by putting forth a final and unyielding offer on a "take-it-or-leave-it"
basis at any time after completing the procedure outlined in
(2) above. With a "reasonableness" test, a "take-it-or-leave-it"
position is not necessarily a violation of the duty to bargain.
(4) The negotiator should present at least one offer, at some point
during the negotiations, on the basis of which he is not unwilling to contract when impasse is reached. That position should
not be without the "range" of positions "reasonable" in light of
the economic outlook of the employees' locality, the plant, the
industry, and the country.
(5) The NLRB in administering the rule should not attempt to
make the terms and conditions of labor contracts uniform, either inter-industry, intra-industry, or within a particular company or plant.
The aim of the "reasonableness" test is to effect a compromise
between two extremes-merely putting the negotiators in the same
room, and government regulation of contract terms. There is no
likelihood that the Board, which has a tendency to use all the power
given it, will lean toward the first extreme. To prevent the
Board from dictating the agreement, however, safeguards are provided. First, the use of the word "reasonable" implies that the position permitted is any one which might reasonably be held by a
reasonable labor negotiator under the same circumstances. Second,
the rule recognizes that there is more than one reasonable position
by referring to a "range of positions." Third, the rule expressly
provides that in administration the NLRB will not attempt to make
contract terms uniform. This rule of construction will prevent the
NLRB from construing "range of reasonable positions" so narrowly
that only a few positions fall into the category.
The test requires the negotiator to present at least one position
"at some point during the negotiations" that is acceptable under
the rule. How many unreasonable positions the negotiator presents
or when he presents his one "reasonable" position should not matter if he is not unwilling to contract on that offer when impasse is
reached. The "not unwilling to contract" language places the burden of proving unwillingness on the objecting party, since willingness to contract is presumed from the making of a proposal.
Further, the burden of proving that a position is "without the
range" of reasonable positions should be on the objecting party.
A position should be presumed reasonable until proved otherwise
by those attacking it where, as here, the burden is not insurmountable when so placed. The federal government, using data collected
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by its various agencies, especially the Department of Labor, is in a
better position to offer evidence of the economic condition of the
nation and industry and the cost of living in the area where the
employees live. Information tending to show the company's financial position through the window with the greenest tint can be
found in the reports to the shareholders. If this is unavailable or
unreliable, a presumption may be indulged in that the company is
in roughly the same financial condition as the industry in general,
modified by other information discovered by the Board. The company should not be forced to open its books or reveal its secrets
except as it desires to do so.
On judicial review no additional facts may be introduced, thus
forcing the company to withstand the temptation to hold back information pending the decision at the lower level. The appellate
court would be allowed to reverse only for substantial error in fact
finding by the Board or upon evidence that the Board misapplied
the law or abused its authority.
The chief objection to this rule from management will probably
be that the company is forced to reveal too much of its financial
condition. The company's financial condition, however, is only one
of several considerations in the determination of what a "reasonable offer" might be. The range of reasonable positions is sufficiently broad that only the negotiator who is barely within the
range need fear that he must reveal more from the company's
books than he desires. It will certainly be the unusual situation
when much is grudgingly revealed.
The unions' chief objection probably will be that they will lose
power because employers will no longer be required to "give in,
at least a little, to prove that benefits come from unions rather
than employers."'17 3 But "certainly it should not be public policy
to see that unionism is always triumphant, or that a union leader
The government guarantees the emis always the winner.' T4
ployee a fair deal when it guarantees him a reasonable company
offer. Unions should not be given credit for more than they achieve.
Unions deserve credit for what they obtain in excess of the higher
of the minimum reasonable offer and the company's initial offer, plus the degree to which the presence and strength of the
union forces up the initial offer of the company. The rule should
not cause unions to lose members; the IUE failed to lose members
to GE's Boulwarism. If there is a membership decline it will be
because that union's value to its members had been vastly overrated by the membership.
CONCLUSION

The law of the duty to bargain in good faith is apparently
173. Petro, supra note 124, at p. 9.
NORTHRUP, op. cit. supra note 170, at 120.
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headed for a thorough reevaluation and probable revision as a result of the NLRB's GE decision. As Member Fanning of the NLRB
has remarked, "It seems likely that the Supreme Court will eventually have to give guidance in this area.' u75 Perhaps the Court
will overrule, explain away, or ignore the fourteen year old dictum
in American Nat'l Ins. Co. that "the Board may not, either directly
or indirectly, compel concessions or otherwise sit in judgment upon
the substantive terms of collective bargaining agreements."' 76 That
dictum is certainly out of touch with today's sophisticated management-labor relations and bargaining needs. The suggested "reasonableness" rule should be adopted on appeal of the General Electric case. The rule will more likely be adopted, however, through a
gradual process as the rule is developed by the NLRB and suggested

to the Court or through Congressional action.

175. Fanning, The Duty to Bargain in 1962, 51 L.R.R.M. 87 (1963). An
appeal from the NLRB decision in the GE case is currently pending in the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals.
176. NLRB v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395, 404 (1952).

